Alfred Thayer Mahan
American Admiral and Naval Historian
1840-1914 A selection from
THE INFLUENCE OF SEA POWER UPON HISTORY
Narrated by Jeff Riggenbach
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Introductory
The history of Sea Power is largely, though by no means solely, a
narrative of contests between nations, of mutual rivalries, of
violence frequently culminating in war. The profound influence of sea
commerce upon the wealth and strength of countries was clearly seen
long before the true principles which governed its growth and
prosperity were detected. To secure to one's own people a
disproportionate share of such benefits, every effort was made to
exclude others, either by the peaceful legislative methods of monopoly
or prohibitory regulations, or, when these failed, by direct violence.
The clash of interests, the angry feelings roused by conflicting
attempts thus to appropriate the larger share, if not the whole, of
the advantages of commerce, and of distant unsettled commercial
regions, led to wars. On the other hand, wars arising from other
causes have been greatly modified in their conduct and issue by the
control of the sea. Therefore the history of sea power, while
embracing in its broad sweep all that tends to make a people great
upon the sea or by the sea, is largely a military history; and it is
in this aspect that it will be mainly, though not exclusively,
regarded.
It is in wider operations, which embrace a whole theatre
of war, and in a maritime contest may cover a large portion of the
globe, that the teachings of history have a more evident and permanent
value, because the conditions remain more permanent. The theatre of
war may be larger or smaller, its difficulties more or less
pronounced, the contending armies more or less great, the necessary
movements more or less easy, but these are simply differences of
scale, of degree, not of kind.
As a wilderness gives place to
civilization, as means of communication multiply, as roads are opened,
rivers bridged, food-resources increased, the operations of war become
easier, more rapid, more extensive; but the principles to which they
must be conformed remain the same. When the march on foot was replaced
by carrying troops in coaches, when the latter in turn gave place to
railroads, the scale of distances was increased, or, if you will, the
scale of time diminished; but the principles which dictated the point
at which the army should be concentrated, the direction in which it
should move, the part of the enemy's position which it should assail,
the protection of communications, were not altered. So, on the sea,
the advance from the galley timidly creeping from port to port to the
sailing-ship launching out boldly to the ends of the earth, and from
the latter to the steamship of our own time, has increased the scope
and the rapidity of naval operations without necessarily changing the
principles which should direct them. Before hostile armies or fleets
are brought into contact (a word which perhaps better than any other
indicates the dividing line between
tactics and strategy), there are a number of questions to be
decided, covering the whole plan of operations throughout the theatre
of war.
Among these are the proper function of the navy in the war;
its true objective; the point or points upon which it should be
concentrated; the establishment of depots of coal and supplies; the
maintenance of communications between these depots and the home base;
the military value of commerce-destroying as a decisive or a secondary
operation of war; the system upon which commerce-destroying can be
most efficiently conducted, whether by scattered cruisers or by
holding in force some vital centre through which commercial shipping
must pass. All these are strategic questions, and upon all these
history has a great deal to say.
It is then particularly in the field of naval strategy that the
teachings of the past have a value which is in no degree lessened.
They are there useful not only as illustrative of principles, but also
as precedents, owing to the comparative permanence of the conditions.
This is less obviously true as to tactics, when the fleets come into
collision at the point to which strategic considerations have brought
them. The unresting progress of mankind causes continual change in the
weapons; and with that must come a continual change in the manner of
fighting,—in the handling and disposition of troops or ships on the
battlefield. Hence arises a tendency on the part of many connected
with maritime matters to think that no advantage is to be gained from
the study of former experiences; that time so used is wasted.
This
view, though natural, not only leaves wholly out of sight those broad
strategic considerations which lead nations to put fleets afloat,
which direct the sphere of their action, and so have modified and will
continue to modify the history of the world, but is one-sided and
narrow even as to tactics. The battles of the past succeeded or failed
according as they were fought in conformity with the principles of
war; and the seaman who carefully studies the causes of success or
failure will not only detect and gradually assimilate these
principles, but will also acquire increased aptitude in applying them
to the tactical use of the ships and weapons of his own day. He will
observe also that changes of tactics have not only taken place after
changes in weapons, which necessarily is the case, but that the
interval between such changes has been unduly long.
This doubtless
arises from the fact that an improvement of weapons is due to the
energy of one or two men, while changes in tactics have to overcome
the inertia of a conservative class; but it is a great evil. It can be
remedied only by a candid recognition of each change, by careful study
of the powers and limitations of the new ship or weapon, and by a
consequent adaptation of the method of using it to the qualities it
possesses, which will constitute its tactics. History shows that it is
vain to hope that military men generally will be at the pains to do
this, but that the one who does will go into battle with a great
advantage,—a lesson in itself of no mean value.
The battle of the Nile, in 1798, was not only an overwhelming victory
for the English over the French fleet, but had also the decisive
effect of destroying the communications between France and Napoleon's
army in Egypt. In the battle itself the English admiral, Nelson, gave
a most brilliant example of grand tactics, if that be, as has been
defined, "the art of making good combinations preliminary to battles
as well as during their progress."
The particular tactical combination
depended upon a condition now passed away, which was the inability of
the lee ships of a fleet at anchor to come to the help of the weather
ones before the latter were destroyed; but the principles which
underlay the combination, namely, to choose that part of the enemy's
order which can least easily be helped, and to attack it with superior
forces, has not passed away. The action of Admiral Jervis at Cape St.
Vincent, when with fifteen ships he won a victory over twenty-seven,
was dictated by the same principle, though in this case the enemy was
not at anchor, but under way. Yet men's minds are so constituted that
they seem more impressed by the transiency of the conditions than by
the undying principle which coped with them. In the strategic effect
of Nelson's victory upon the course of the war, on the contrary, the
principle involved is not only more easily recognized, but it is at
once seen to be applicable to our own day.
The issue of the enterprise
in Egypt depended upon keeping open the communications with France.
The victory of the Nile destroyed the naval force, by which alone the
communications could be assured, and determined the final failure; and
it is at once seen, not only that the blow was struck in accordance
with the principle of striking at the enemy's line of communication,
but also that the same principle is valid now, and would be equally so
in the days of the galley as of the sailing-ship or steamer.
The definitions usually given of the word "strategy" confine it to
military combinations embracing one or more fields of operations,
either wholly distinct or mutually dependent, but always regarded as
actual or immediate scenes of war. However this may be on shore, a
recent French author is quite right in pointing out that such a
definition is too narrow for naval strategy. "This," he says, "differs
from military strategy in that it is as necessary in peace as in war.
Indeed, in peace it may gain its most decisive victories by occupying
in a country, either by purchase or treaty, excellent positions which
would perhaps hardly be got by war.
It learns to profit by all
opportunities of settling on some chosen point of a coast, and to
render definitive an occupation which at first was only transient." A
generation that has seen England within ten years occupy successively
Cyprus and Egypt, under terms and conditions on their face transient,
but which have not yet led to the abandonment of the positions taken,
can readily agree with this remark; which indeed receives constant
illustration from the quiet persistency with which all the great sea
powers are seeking position after position, less noted and less
noteworthy than Cyprus and Egypt, in the different seas to which their
people and their ships penetrate. "Naval strategy has indeed for its
end to found, support, and increase, as well in peace as in war, the
sea power of a country;" and therefore its study has an interest and
value for all citizens of a free country, but especially for those who
are charged with its foreign and military relations. More information about Alfred Thayer Mahan from Wikipedia
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